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IV.
Confucius the Shi:
The Search for the Historical Confucius by Wav of His Class Interest
By Christopher Schwartz (Graduate Student)
INTRODUCTION
The historical Confucius was a member of the Shi (knightly) class. As such, he was 
subject to the socioeconomic transformations that affected his class during the Spring and 
Autumn Period—transformations that eventually evolved them into the basis for China’s original 
intelligentsia, the Rujia. Therefore, I will focus upon the philosopher’s social rank and 
profession as the key to understanding the man he may have actually been. Specifically, my 
question is whether Confucius’s philosophy of “sagehood” or “authoritative personhood”
(Pinyin: ren; Wade-Giles: jen*) was reflective of his class conditions and interests, and if so, in 
which ways? I argue that his condition as a member of the Shi class was a crucial factor, for his 
class interest informed, if not led to, his philosophy of intersubjective “person building.”
A statement of rationale is in order, for our Platonic heritage tends to bias we Westerners 
against the notion that fundamentally worldly concerns can and do motivate abstract moral 
inquiry. This bias results from our very vocabulary of “worldly” and “otherworldly,” alongside 
related oppositionals “theory” and “practice,” “being” and “non-being,” and so on. Such 
vocabulary, imbued as it is with unconscious connotations of moral hierarchy, predisposes us to 
disdain the historical conditions of philosophical thought. “The dichotomy of theory and 
practice has so long been presupposed in our tradition that the philosophical categories that form 
the inventory of our speculative notions are themselves constructed with reference to this 
dichotomy.”1 Historical conditions such as class interest, ever morphing and contingent though 
they are, are as much at the root of the question, “What is the good life?” as any other motivating 
force.
In saying this, my intention is not to engage in Communist reductionism, or reductionism 
of any other variety. I am simply looking for a historical condition that could help elucidate the 
historical Confucius. I believe class interest is one such historical condition, and an important 
one. The salient point to keep in mind is that even if Confucius’ motivation began with narrow 
class interest, his philosophy was such that any and all human beings could and should partake in 
its prescriptions.
Philosophical investigation is conditioned by historical circumstances. For example, no 
less a Western intellectual giant as Aristotle professed the aim of living to be the attainment o f 
sufficient leisure time for the purpose of involving oneself in political activity without 
distractions (such as toiling for food or money). His vision of the good life was consistent with
Hall, David L. and Ames, Roger T. Thinking Through Confucius. Albany, New York: State University o f New 
York Press, 1987. p. 38.
The Histories, Volume 7, Number 2 18
post-Homeric Greek culture.2 The difference between Aristotle’s vision of the good life and that 
of, say, Marx, is proof enough that the historicity of philosophy—that is, the place and time in 
which a philosopher is thinking—is just as important as the ideas themselves. More to the point, 
analyzing the socioeconomic and political contingencies underlying those ideas will tell us a 
great deal about the evolving nature of humanity’s quest to answer the riddle of existence.
My procedure will be as follows:
(1) I will meditate upon the difficult nature of the extant sources and establish my own 
position with regards to which evidence to use.
(2) I will then propose a historiography for the era and use it to explicate the situation in 
China during the Axial Age.
And finally, (3) I will explain the connection between Shi and the Rujia via the 
philosophy and person of Confucius.
I identify three ironies in the history of Confucius and the Shi:
(A) The Rujia were the result of the Shi’s adaptation to “feudal” circumstances.
(B) This adaptation was both necessitated and aided by the rivalries within the leadership 
of the feudal aristocracy.
And, (C) the connection between Shi and the Rujia was prefigured by the philosophy and 
person of Confucius:
(C-a) Defining “ren " as an educational model o f the self: Confucian ren was 
fundamentally a philosophy of education. It thus prefigured the Shi’s turn to education as their 
main vocation during the Warring States Period.
 And, (C-b) the life o f Confucius as prototype for the Rujia: Confucian ren reflected the 
Shi's state of intense socioeconomic and compositional fluidity. More importantly, it .was 
symptomatic of larger historical energies sweeping through ancient Chinese history. As such, it 
also provided an ideological framework suitable for the Shi to adapt to the disruptive realities of 
the feudal order.
I will address Ironies (A) and (B) in the section entitled, “Distinguishing the Shi from the 
Rujia,” and Irony (C) in the section entitled, “Ren and the Shi.” The foundation for my analysis 
o f Confucius is the exegesis of David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames in Thinking Through 
Confucius. Like them, my perspective will be macroscopic. However, where they ask how may 
we compare, contrast, and cross-fertilize the intellectual history of the West with original 
Confucian philosophy? I ask what are the major underlying patterns or themes of his era, and 
how do these relate to the Shi and the historical Confucius? Their aim is to get inside the head of 
Confucius and see the West through his eyes. My aim is to get inside the world of Confucius to 
get inside his head.
My position is that classical China underwent a monumental shift toward social and 
political consolidation with heavy aspects of centralization. The loose agrarian affiliations of the 
immediate post-Westem Zhou period evolved into organized “fiefdoms” with urban centers of 
political power and culture. Those fiefdoms, in turn, evolved (and in evolving, succumbed to) 
the Qin Empire. This transition was itself symptomatic of a massive process seen all throughout
2 Even after Socrates, ancient Greek values were distinctly Mycenaean. Athenian citizenship retained a conception 
of the good (agathos) from the Homeric past, specifically, that a good man was he who acquired enough resources 
to preserve or augment his household. The pre-Socratic conception o f eudaemonia (“the good life,” “the felicitous 
existence”), which persisted right through the Peloponnesian War and beyond, consisted of inheriting an estate 
prosperous enough to render a man as nearly self-sufficient as possible. The goal o f self-sufficiency was to become 
free enough to devote himself to politics, that is, the management and cultivation of the state.
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the Axial Age civilizations, and I adopt the term “rectification,” from the Confucian expression 
zheng ming (Wade-Giles: cheng ming*, translated by Legge: “rectification of names”; Hall- 
Ames: “ordering names” — An. 13:3), to explicate its patterns and themes as it occurred in 
China. This massive “rectificational” sweep toward centralized consolidation was particularly 
manifest in ancient Chinese society in Confucian philosophy. Thus, in answering my question, I 
must ask the additional questions:
(1) What was the class structure of the Spring and Autumn Period?
And, (2) how did the Confucian personality emerge from that structure?”
Finding answers will require serious revisionism on my part. Revisionism in this case is 
defined as a concerted act of stepping outside the constraints o f traditional Chinese 
historiography and hagiography, and even previous Western interpretations, and attempting to 
approach my subject mind-to-mind. In doing so, I am acting upon the assumption that real 
people, even monks, exist in communities, and are as much defined by their communities as their 
communities are defined by them. Essentially, I will be trying to approach my subject through a 
viewpoint consistent with the Confucian vision of the human person as a perpetual act (li) of 
self-recreation and signification (yi), and in doing so apply the highest standard of Confucianism 
to Confucius himself. “It may be a mistake to think of him as finding his message first and 
attracting disciples afterwards... his disciples learn more from his, as from an inspiring 
schoolmaster, much more than is on the curriculum,”3 and so, too, will we.
ANSWERS FROM THE ANALECTS
Though archeology has uncovered a wealth of data on ancient China, conditions are still 
such in the subject area of the ancient world that historians remain reliant upon texts, scant and 
flawed though these are. When I first set about writing this essay, I intended to recount the life 
of Confucius. I now realize that to do so would be folly, for I have only a limited amount of time 
and ink to spend here. It would be more efficacious for you and I that I stay focused upon my 
central question. In order to reconstruct his biography in any meaningful detail, I would have to 
go about the arduous task of collating and digesting for you the vast literary materials which 
identify him as their author.
For the following reasons, I have chosen the Analects to be my source:
(A) It appears that the Analects were written over a period of 30 to 50 years, beginning in 
the Spring and Autumn Period and finishing either during or after the Warring States Period. 
James Legge believed, “It is best to rest in the general conclusion, that it was compiled by the 
disciples of the disciples of the sage, making free use of the written memorials concerning him 
which they had received, and the oral statements which they had heard, from their several 
masters.”4 Modem textual and philological evidence has confirmed that the Analects were 
almost certainly not the direct work of Confucius’ own pen, but of someone or some group 
intimately influenced by him.
And, (B) according to Benjamin Schwartz, “the consensus among modem scholars is that 
our most reliable source for the early Confucian school, if not for the vision of the Master
3 Graham, A.C. Disputers o f  the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China. La Salle, Ill.: Open Court
Publishing Company, 1989. p. 10. See also: the introduction to Graham, A.C. Studies in Chinese Philosophy and 
Philosophical Literature. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 1986. pp. 1-6.
4 Legge, James. Confucius: Confucian Analects, The Great Learning, and The Doctrine o f  the Mean. Chinese Text; 
Translation with Exegetical Notes and Dictionary o f  all Characters. New York City: Dover Publications, Inc.,
1971. p. 16.
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himself, is the collection of brief dialogues and gnomic utterances in the collection called in 
Chinese the Lun-yu [Analects]''5 *7
Though modem scholars think highly of the Analects’ usefulness, Michael Nylan points 
out that for a significant period of time the text was neglected, remarkably by the Chinese 
themselves.
Today, a student seeking to understand the basic tenets of Confucius and Confucianism 
would most likely turn to the Analects, [but] until relatively late in the history of 
Confucian classicism, during the Sui-Tang period (581-907), the Analects was 
considered far less important as a source of Confucius’s ideas than the Five Classics, 
especially the Chunqiu or Spring and Autumn Annals, a text widely believed to have 
been written by Confucius.
Scriptural status was awarded to the Five Classics, not the Analects. This situation was reversed 
with the introduction of Song thinker Zhu Xi’s Cheng-Zhu school, which treated the Five 
Classics “on the model of anthologies, whose selection might vary in worth,” and their shifted 
concentration to the Analects.1 7 The Cheng-Zhu school “claimed to have rediscovered an inner- 
oriented hermeneutics devoted more to questions of human nature than the old Han learning [the 
Five Classics-based education], which had sought to define shared patterns of sympathetic 
interaction operating in the political, social, and cosmic realms.”8 Analogous time-wise to the 
Scholasticism going on in Europe, this change in focus had far-reaching ramifications for 
Chinese history: “[a] dramatic turn that Chinese thought took during the Song dynasty, which 
represented a virtual reassessment and reinvention of the Confucian message, as sweeping in its 
own way as the Protestant Reformation of Catholicism.”9
Legge argued that the “books” (or chapters) comprising the Analects are grouped by 
individual themes or common characters, though the chapters are not arranged in any way so as 
to carry a continuous train of thought or idea.10 For the most part, Legge’s observation carries to 
today. Dissenting voices do exist. One comes from E. Bruce and Taeko Brooks, who suggest an 
alternative interpretation of the chapters’ organization based upon patterns of language usage 
within the text. In their view the received text is heavily accreted by interpolations from later 
schools.11 Schwartz identifies other likeminded scholars, notably Tsuda Sokichi, “a radical and 
iconoclastic critic of the text,” who “finds the work so shot through with contradictions and 
anachronisms that it is unusable as a source of the thought of Confucius.”12 For their part, Hall 
and Ames do not make the claim that the historical Confucius is to be solely or necessarily found . .  
in the Analects. Rather, their goal is “to explicate the thought of Confucius as it appears in the 
Analects” 13 (my italics). However, I find their exegesis to be so convincing in its humanity and 
cogency as to lead me to believe that the mind they describe as inhabiting the Analects must in
5 Schwartz, Benjamin I. The World o f  Thought in Ancient China. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press o f Harvard
University Press, 1985. p. 61.
6 Nylan, Michael. The Five "Confucian " Classics. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2001. p. 10.
7 Ibid., p. 55.
8 Ibid, p. 54.
9 Ibid, p. 10.
10 Legge, Confucius, pp. 12-13.
11 See: Brooks, E. Bruce and Taeko. The Original Analects. New York City: Columbia University Press, 2001.
12 Schwartz, Thought in Ancient China, p. 61.
13 Hall and Ames, Thinking Through Confucius, p. 11.
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fact be the mind of the man himself. Even were it not Confucius himself but some anonymous 
philosopher or a “corporate personality”14 of several different thinkers, the name has been so 
long attached to this philosopher or philosophers that pushing that distinction very far would be 
nonsensical.
For a Western mind constructed upon the discursive tradition founded by the ancient 
Greeks, the haphazard arrangement of the chapters both within themselves and between each 
other indicates a want of reasoning in Confucius. However, Bryan van Norden counters,
...as anyone who has been through an introductory philosophy class knows, recognizing 
and reconstructing an argument in a piece of text is a far from straightforward matter.
One of the reasons for this is that most arguments in ordinary language are enthymemic. 
That is, the conclusion, or some of the premises, are not stated explicitly. It may have 
been superfluous to state the implied conclusion or premises for the original audience, 
to whom they would have been obvious. But to an audience separated from the original 
author by gulfs of culture and time, the loss of background knowledge of key premises 
may make even the most powerful argument seem a tangle of sophistries and non- 
sequitors.15
To this I add my own argument: Confucius was in fact a philosopher, as much as by Western 
standards (phila+sophia) as by Chinese (zhejia).
(A) If you and I minimally define “philosophy” as the “love” and/or “pursuit of 
wisdom,” then the Master certainly meets the criteria. He is fundamentally concerned with 
questions which can be re-construed into English as, “What'is the good life?” and “What must I 
do to be good?” as well as definitions of justice, virtue, and truth, all of which are the key 
concerns of ethical philosophy. “The Chinese compound that most frequently translates ethics is 
dao-de [Pinyin: tau-te\ translated by Hansen: ‘way-virtue’; Hall-Ames: ‘road-focus’]. Classical 
thinkers used the component terms separately through most of the period... [The] compounding 
accompanies the emergence o f a dominant position. Any complete ethical stance requires both 
dao and de.”16 The connotations may be different— "Dao differs from duty ethics in not having 
sentential form. It also lacks the axiomatic or. theoretical structure of Western systems. Dao 
guides discourse in general”17 and “De does not simply consist in favorable attitudes, feelings, or 
motivations. It is a hypothetical structure of dispositions essential to the proper performance of 
any dao. It is the ability to recognize, interpret, and perform a dao'M—but at base we’re dealing 
with the same thing: “This unfamiliar conceptual structure with its background assumptions 
generates a fresh dynamic. The dominant position... is that any plausible ethical stance requires 
both dao and de. The reasons, however, are not the familiar Western points that we must do 
moral actions ‘for the right reasons’ or ‘with the right attitude.’ We require de to vouch safe 
correct performance of a dao."19
14 Ibid., p. 307.
van Norden, Bryan. “What Should Western Philosophy Learn from Chinese Philosophy?” in Ivanhoe, Philip J., 
ed. Chinese Language, Thought, and Culture: Nivison and his Critics. La Salle, 111.: Open Court Publishing 
Company, 1996. p. 235.
Hansen, C. “Duty and Virtue” in Ivanhoe, Philip J., ed. Chinese Language, Thought, and Culture: Nivison and 
his Critics. La Salle, III.: Open Court Publishing Company, 1996. p. 175.
17 Ibid., p. 174.
18 Ibid., p. 174.
15 Ibid, p. 175.
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(B) Even if we include in our definition of philosophy the requirement of rational 
demonstration, Confucius still passes muster. “It is commonplace that even in the Axial Age 
rational demonstration had a much smaller place in Chinese than in Greek thought... [The] 
analysis of Chinese concepts, identification of technical terms, uncovering of the presuppositions 
behind apparent gaps in argument, not to mention the grammar of the language itself, has 
revealed that most of the ancient Chinese thinkers are very much more rational than they used to 
look.”20 Hall and Ames explain,
The dynamics of “thinking” in Confucius can be explicated as a continuing interplay 
among “learning” [Pinyin: xue; Wade-Giles: hsueh] and “reflecting” [Pinyin: si; Wade- 
Giles: ssu, szu), the consequence of which is “realizing” [Pinyin: zhi; Wade-Giles: chih] 
through “living up to one’s word” [Pinyin: xin; Wade-Giles: hsin*]. The 
“learning" / reflecting” polarity might be roughly construed as the functional equivalent 
of reasoning in the dominant Western paradigm, “realizing” would correspond to 
“knowing,” and “living up to one’s word” would correspond to at least one meaning of 
“truth.” [...] Thinking for Confucius is not to be understood as a process of abstract 
reasoning, but is fundamentally performative in that it is an activity whose immediate 
consequence is the achievement of a practical result. Far from being a means for lifting 
oneself out of the world of experience, thinking for Confucius is fundamentally 
integrative, a profoundly concrete activity which seeks to maximize the potential of the 
existing possibilities and the contributing conditions. Thus, in place of any activity that 
merely assesses an objective set of facts and/or values, thinking for Confucius is 
actualizing or realizing the meaningfulness of the world.21 [Italics in original.]
Thus, in his eudaemonist concerns and his deployment of rationality—something revolutionary 
for his time and place, regardless of whether he realized it or not—Confucius was very much an 
Axial Age thinker, equal to Socrates.
THE AXIAL AGE IN CHINA
The Axial Age was a global phenomenon of human development first identified by Karl 
Jaspers. In his book, The Origin and Goal o f History, he points out a number of key thinkers in 
ancient Greece, the Middle East, India, and China, during the time span 800-200 BCE, who 
shared strikingly similar intellectual projects that profoundly influenced the history’s classical 
civilizations. A.C. Graham writes, “China, like other civilizations of the Old World, draws its 
basic ideas from [this] time of awakening... The creative thinking of that era seems everywhere 
to have sprung up amid the variety and instability of competing states; in China it begins towards 
500 BCE, in a time of political disunion, and may be judged to lose its impetus with the 
reunification of the empire in 221 BC.”22 My position is that Graham, who is working with a 
traditional Chinese historiography that began with the Tso Chuan, is correct in the overall picture 
he paints, but incorrect in certain details: the Spring and Autumn Period was not a “disunity,” nor 
was the founding of the Qin Empire a “reunification,” but rather that the two represented phases 
in a monumental sweep toward centralized consolidation.
Spring and Autumn society was the result of the transition ancient China underwent from
20 Graham, Disputers, p. 7. Note his reflection on p. 8.
22 Graham, Disputers, p. 31.
21 Hall and Ames, Thinking Through Confucius, pp. 43-44.
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the advanced chieftainships of the Xia/Shang/Western Zhou “sage-kingdoms” era to Qin/Han 
monarchism via Eastern Zhou Fengjian (“feudalism”).23 I call this transition the process of 
“rectification.” My usage of the term is derived from the Confucian concept zheng ming. The 
concept makes its first explicit appearance in the famous passage An. 13:3, and is tacitly referred 
to throughout the text, for example “Is it a ritual goblet that is not a ritual goblet really a ritual 
goblet? Is it a ritual goblet?” (An. 6:25) and “Duke Ching of Ch’i asked Confucius about 
effecting sociopolitical order, and Confucius replied, ‘The ruler ought to be ruler, the subject 
subject, the father father and son son” (An. 12:11). Hall and Ames dispute the standard 
translation of “rectification of names” and propose “ordering names” as more fitting to the spirit 
of the text:
In so construing this concept... we must be give full account to the performative force 
of naming. The prevailing interpretation of ordering names as the ‘rectification of 
names’ fails to do so. It tends to treat names in terms of some theoretical schema that 
has been inherited out of the tradition, and that can be hypostatized and hence rectified 
by behaviors that satisfy the standing theoretical construct. [...] The standard 
interpretation of zheng ming has it that there is an established definition—characteristics 
and function—of what it means to be a ritual goblet or a ruler, and that any breach 
between theoretical definition and actual performance is a source of disorder.24
23 Were the views of established historiography, both traditional Chinese and Western, accurate, we should 
understand the three dynasties as actually having been kingdoms at all. However, archeological evidence shows 
that, at best, they weren’t so much monarchies as highly evolved agrarian chieftainships, and that the peace and 
stability they established was far from tranquil and absolute-in fact, the later Spring and Autumn feudalism seems 
its natural, logical outgrowth, not its Frankensteinian mutation. Even the traditional chronology is deceptive. 
Schwartz points out (Thought in Ancient China, p. 16) that the sage-kingdoms “may not have simply been sequential 
in time, but may have existed for long periods as ‘overlapping entities.’ Here, again, there may have been no one 
pristine state originating at one center but the simultaneous evolution o f several more or less developed ‘state 
formations’ over a wide area.”
How can we account for the traditional perspective? One explanation is that it was the result o f the 
political and ideological interests of the Han dynasty. Since scholarship and religious sensibility have long been 
entwined in China, insight can be gained by looking at the editorial history behind the Five Classics. Nylan points 
out (Classics, pp. 42 and 47), “The very concept of a sacred canon or scripture had spring from the imperial desire to 
impose tighter connections between the central state and local traditions of scholarship.” Just as the Western Zhou 
regime probably appropriated certain Shang concepts (notably, the tian ming, “mandate of heaven”) to give itself 
legitimacy, so too did the Han Empire appropriate Confucius for its own purposes. Part of that process of 
appropriation was to establish continuity between the sage-kingdoms and themselves. Logically, then, the 
interceding period o f the Eastern Zhou had to be derided as an era of decay and catastrophic detour. Ironically, the 
historiographers o f the next dynasty repeated this process for the Han, and so too for the next, and on and on in 
various forms. To some extent, even the Communists utilized this technique in the 20th Century.
1 do not believe the explanation is so simple. Rather than invention, the dynastic historiographers were 
actually tapping into a sentiment already widespread by the end of the Warring States Period, namely, a profound 
nostalgia for an idealized past age o f peace and tranquility. The destruction of the Western Zhou capital in the 
Eleventh or Tenth Centuries BCE created the bundle o f memories, trauma, and experiences that helped form 
Chinese identity. Clearly, then, the traditional historiography was molded by its contemporary circumstances: just 
as the Medieval European painters rendered Jerusalem a French or German town, so too do the imperial historians 
render the Chinese past into something more Han than Zhou. As with their Western counterparts, for the dynastic 
historiographers the past was not passive, a mere slag o f plastic that they shape, but was itself active, a reagent in 
their imaginative process.
24 Hall and Ames, Thinking Through Confucius, p. 270.
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Though Confucius obviously evinced a profound awe for the institutions of the past, Hall and 
Ames argue that he did not believe a Xerox reconstruction of the sage-kingdoms world and 
culture would have actually sufficed. “Our interpretation of ‘ordering names’ argues against the 
priority of formal constructions by rejecting the suggestion that Confucius simply uses names 
reductionistically to organize the process of human experience into some preestablished pattern 
that is held to define the meaning, value and purpose of life.”25 In Confucius’ mind, then, 
salvation was to be found in creatively re-interpreting and re-applying the Western Zhou world 
and culture to present circumstances. “For Confucius [the] doctrine o f ‘ordering names’ is the 
starting point of sociopolitical order.”26
I use the term with purposeful irony:
(A) On the one hand, from the viewpoint of traditional Chinese historiography and 
Western interpreters like Graham, the transition of the Eastern Zhou era would logically 
represent a gradual process of “matching theory with practice,” “practicing what you preach,” 
etc. The Eastern Zhou regime proclaimed themselves an empire, but the reality of their 
government was the contrary. According to this perspective, it was not until the Qin and the Han 
dynasties when true imperialism was (re)attained—in other words, a “rectification of names” on 
a grand scale.
And, (B) on the other hand, what happened during the Eastern Zhou era was consistent 
with the Hall and Ames interpretation of zheng ming\ “A full explanation of Confucius’ doctrine 
of ‘ordering names,’ in addition to reflecting his appreciation for the way in which language 
conveys past realizations of the world, must provide some account of how naming can be used 
creatively to realize new worlds appropriate to emerging circumstances.”27 The vying aristocrats 
and warlords of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States Periods, and even the future Yellow 
Emperor himself, were unknowingly realizing a new world from their circumstances, namely, 
Imperial China—an “ordering of names” on a grander, subtler, profounder scale.
There is a catch: Chinese civilizational “rectification” is one of those historical processes, 
like its contemporary counterpart synoecism in ancient Greece, or broader processes like 
technological invention and the spread of religious ideas, that, once begun, is pulled by its own 
logic toward a final end—centralized consolidation. Atoms are crushed together into molecules, 
and molecules stitched together into tissue, and tissues compiled into organs, and organs 
connected into physiological systems, and physiological systems arranged into bodies, all 
brought about by the simple, necessary, and nearly invisible romance of positive and negative 
charges at the subatomic level. So, too, for ancient China: the very conditions that gave birth to 
the Spring and Autumn and Warring States fiefdoms also brought about their absorption into the 
Qin Empire. These conditions were the ambitions of elites, the need to amass, control, and 
safeguard resources and trade routes, and the need to regulate class conflict within ducal 
domains, all within the framework of Fengjian feudalism.
Rectification is therefore neither a symptom of the gradual “collapse” of the Zhou 
regime, nor of a long and grueling recovery. Rather, rectification itself is the change from the 
Zhou to the Qin, and all other things from the era, even war and rationalism, are its symptoms. It 
is a human process resulting from the expression of certain human traits when put under certain 
geo-psychological conditions. Events from the era can all be re-understood within this 
interpretation. The Zhou royal court’s flight eastward both threatened and spurred on
25 Ibid., p .274.
26 Ibid., p. 270.
27 Ibid., p.273.
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rectification, and the Spring and Autumn Period injected more energy into the process— 
Confucius’ grandfather, the warrior Ho, fought for something far greater than he ever realized. 
The catastrophic contest between the fiefdoms was neither a detour from the process, as 
Confucius and his peers unconsciously interpreted it, nor the decline and calamitous fall of 
imperialism, as scholars such as Graham interpret it. Instead, the Warring States Period can be 
re-construed as an intermediary step between chieftainship and empire. The same is true for the 
fiefdoms themselves.
According to this interpretation, the Spring and Autumn Period was a “chapter” in the 
epic of the geographical and psychological expansion of the Zhou world toward its peripheries. 
While the direction of their expansion was rectificational, the engine driving this movement was 
a cultural trilectic very conspicuous within Chinese history:
(A) The interaction of the “civilized” fiefdoms in the Yellow River interior with the 
“barbarians” beyond the frontier and the “semi-barbarian” societies which arose between them.
(B) The gradual absorption of the “barbarians” and “semi-barbarians” into the Zhongguo 
(“Central States”) core cluster.
And, (C) the cluster’s continual re-creation as a consequence of their absorption.
The Spring and Autumn chapter of this epic, then, is what archeological and linguistic 
evidence suggests was an aggregation of several independent ethnicities and cultures in the 
region into a large, multi-fiefdom, multicultural system of Fengjian feudalism and, to some 
extent, the Ba (“hegemony”) system of feudal alliances.28
An advisory on the use of the term “feudal”: Schwartz explains,
The fact that many Western scholars have described the major features of the system as 
“feudal” encourages doubt. Our own associations with this troublesome word is 
generally that of the disintegration of power rather than of stability and order. It 
suggests fragmentation and strife... [Yet] if we define the term in a minimalist “system 
of government in which a ruler delegates limited sovereignty over portions of his 
territory to vassals,” we may apply it to the early Chou [sic] situation. We must simply 
add the commentary that feudalism presupposes the notion of an inclusive political 
framework in which a superior ruler confers power from above and that if the term is 
applied to China, we must stress that the “vassals” on whom the power is conferred are 
very often members of the royal lineage. Conceiving of feudalism in this simple way, 
one may disassociate it completely from the notion of a preexistent highly centralized 
state in disintegration.29
Schwartz’s definition of “feudalism” is consistent with my theory of rectification. It also helps 
resolve the puzzle of why ancient Chinese feudalism instigated the development of professional 
intellectuals, whereas medieval European and Middle Eastern feudalism stifled it. The answer is 
that latter nearly put society into a kind of hypostasis, in China it dislocated society, and thus 
fostered the type of conditions necessary for professional intellectuals:
28 Schwartz, Thought in Ancient China, p. 16
Ibid., pp. 42 and 44: “The high officials of the royal court are often 'feudal lords.' The names of offices are vague 
and fluctuating. The holders o f office do not necessarily perform the functions associated with their titles. Offices 
usually are hereditary within what might be called the lower official nobility [Shi]. The renumeration of office 
holders was the reward o f appanages, which while not necessarily hereditary in principle often became hereditary in 
practice.”
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Historically, creativity has been most in evidence under two prevailing conditions.
There is a creativity that is sponsored by a sense of strength and authority in the state 
where the country feels that it can extend itself into parallel traditions and entertain 
external influences without threatening its cultural stability. There is also a creativity in 
periods such as that of the Warring States where conditions are in such turmoil that 
there is no cultural edifice to resist foreign influence. These influences infiltrate the 
society to be grafted onto the culture as the tradition again rises and reasserts itself.30
The evacuation of the Zhou regime eastward—the event which terminated the era of the “sage- 
kingdoms” and began the rectificational era of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States 
Periods—precipitated the formation of feudalism, which itself was cause and consequence of the 
Axial Age in China. Additionally, the Ba hegemon was the institutional and conceptual 
forerunner of the oncoming Qin Empire. Together, these two institutions reached their climax in 
the Warring States Period, and gave violent birth to Imperial China. Yet, when one takes the 
long view of history, “casting a long glance backward” as it were, their imperial future was 
strongly hinted at during the Spring and Autumn Period. Even then, the main culprit was always 
feudalism, for the hegemony arose as a response to it.
It is ironic that feudalism had been intended to maintain order, when in reality the system 
gave expression to the forces of disruption, namely, the selfishness and unbridled ambitions of 
the aristocracy. The result was war of ever escalating scope and brutality. The fiefdoms’ 
ceaseless conflicts reached several fever pitches before finally petering out: the Battles of 
Chengpu. Bi, and Yanling, recorded in the Tso Chuan; the devastating conflict between the 
‘Three Jins” in the opening phase of the Warring States Period; and the century-long contest 
between Qi and Qin that closed the Eastern Zhou era. Confucius’ lifetime happened to coincide 
with a period of relative peace—In 579 BCE the fiefdoms Qi, Qin, Jin, and Chu finally met for a 
disarmament conference in 579 BCE, and in 546 BCE Jin and Chu signed a second truce-but 
even then small wars continued to erupt. Two notable conflicts from the lifetime of Confucius 
were a civil war in Wei, during which a favorite disciple, Tsze-lu, was slain, and a major 
confrontation in the coastal zone between the fiefdoms Wu and Yue. Indeed, the Wu-Yue 
conflict, which occurred in the waning years of the Master’s life, was prophetic: in style and 
substance it was a prototype for the maelstroms of the Warring States Period. Yet, amidst all this 
death, important conditions were created that formed and forged the character of, the Chinese’s 
original intelligentsia, the Rujia.
DISTINGUISHING THE SHI FROM THE RUJIA
There is no term for “Confucian” or “Confucianism” in Chinese. The terms we find 
instead is Ru and Rujia, used in ancient texts to describe the self-identified followers of 
Confucius, or more precisely, those committed to the “Way” of ethical behavior that they 
believed originated with the sage-kingdoms and which was “transmitted” by the Master. 
However, the term was also used to describe a type of intellectual who made the study of 
antiquity his profession: a classicist. In Warring States and Han texts a distinction is made 
between “ethically-minded” and “career-minded” Ru, but in none of the texts from any period 
are the two fundamental senses of the term (Ru-philosopher and Ru-classicist) ever separated. 
Two questions arise:
30 Hall and Ames, Thinking Through Confucius, p. 312.
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(1) Did “Ru” identify the same type of professional, or conflate two different types?
And, (2) who were the Ru?
Question (1): What type o f professional(s) did the term "ru" signify?
Philology supports the argument that the term Ru was used to identify the same type of 
professional. Because Ru in its original usage meant “soft,” “first applied perhaps by men who 
rule and fight to the softies who merely teach” quips Graham,31 the Ru-classicists probably 
understood the act of studying to also be the act of teaching. Teaching in this sense meant 
“thinking” as described by Hall and Ames: learning and reflection toward realization, which was 
both intellectual cognition and “living up to one’s word.” Here we find a crucial overlap 
between flu-classicist and Ru-philosopher which indicates that the original “Confucians”—the 
philosophers who subscribed to the “Way of Antiquity”—were the classicists. The later post- 
Han distinction was likely not a division between two entirely professional types as it was 
between different personality types within the same profession.
The Rujia were therefore philosophers who operated within a classical framework and 
who were simultaneously classicists who went about their study philosophically. In fact, their 
self-conception possessed no distinction between classicist and philosopher—to have been a 
classicist was also to have been a philosopher. Their prototype was Confucius, for like him, 
these professional intellectuals understood their mission to be the “transmission” (re-creation)32 
of the customs, values, and ethics of the sage-kingdoms.
Whereas in imperial times, the pronounced aspect of the flu mission was civil service, in 
pre-imperial times the pronounced aspect was education. “The rise of Confucianism [Rujia] 
might then be seen as a pervasion of the class of teachers, who discover through Confucius the 
‘one thread’ uniting the diverse disciples [the Six Arts and Five Classics] which they teach...” 
explains Graham.33 “If you wanted your son to have a more than practical education you always 
had to send him to the [flu], however you might grumble that they were stuffing the lad’s head 
with a lot of nonsense.”34
Question (2): Who were the Ru?
To re-state, I perceive three ironies:
(A) The flu were the result of the Shi's adaptation to feudal circumstances.
(B) This adaptation was both necessitated and aided by the rivalries within the leadership 
of the feudal aristocracy.
And, (C) the connection between Shi and the Rujia was prefigured by the philosophy and 
person of Confucius.
Graham, Disputers, p. 31.
32 Hall and Ames, Thinking Through Confucius, p. 25: “one must avoid the temptation to interpret Confucius'
thought from a strictly historical rather than a traditional perspective [i.e., agency-centered vs. continuity-centered 
perspective]. To do so would make o f him an originator, a 'great man,' instead of the 'transmitter' that he understood 
himself to be. On the other hand, unless one remains sensitive to the meaning of creativity in Confucianism, the 
understanding of Confucius as a transmitter of tradition will lead one to mistake him for a mere transmitter, and not 
the sage that he indeed is.” A useful metaphor would be a clay pot. When a pot is tipped and pours out its contents, 
say, water, it cannot be said that the pot created the water; rather, it held it for a period of time. However, at the 
chemical level, the water has been irrevocably changed by its stay in the pot, for trace elements o f the clay have now 
been mixed into it.
33 Graham, Disputers, p. 32.
34 Ibid, p. 33.
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I will now address Ironies (A) and (B) in order to answer the question, “Who were the 
Ru?"  I will address Irony (C) in the next section, “Ren and the Shi."
The original demographic of the Ru arose from the Shi. The Shi were a 
“protobureaucratic”35 element within the nobility who “composed and handled an impressive 
array of documents, were experts in the protocols of ritual, ceremonial, and penal law, and 
manned the lower ranks of the military organization.”36 Essentially, they were analogous to the 
Athenian Hippae. Think of Xenophon: the Hippae were not hoplites (citizen-soldiers), nor 
helots (slave-soldiers), nor conscripts, but lesser gentry, or literati-knights, who held both 
administrative and military posts. Like Xenophon, who was as comfortable with the pen as he 
was the sword, and who sold his martial and mental services to both Persia and Sparta, the Shi 
served as officers and officials, paid in the currency of property and honor. Like Xenophon, who 
was distantly related to the old monarchial line of Athens, the Shi descended from the outer edge 
of the Zhou royal family tree. And like Xenophon, whose fortunes were pegged to the wars of 
elites, the Shi experienced intense fluctuation in their fortunes as the power of their various 
feudal lords rose and fell. Indeed, as the officers and officials of the clashing fiefdoms, there 
were times in which they literally died by the legion. During the Spring and Autumn and 
Warring States Periods, an individual Shi could rise to the heights of power and prestige, as well 
as meteorically plummet to destitution.
Beginning in the Spring and Autumn Period, canny dukes and barons realized that 
effective competition meant more than just an arms race, but also a minds race.
The first step in transforming the role and status of the Shi was the appearance of 
functionaries who served their lords in various capacities, such as sheriffs, stewards, 
judges, and advisors. As Zhou feudalism underwent tremendous changes after the 
collapse of Western Zhou, competition both among and within states made it necessary 
for leaders to gather the best and the most capable persons as assistants. The term xian 
(worthy; i.e., one combining intellectual ability and moral integrity), was introduced as 
a criterion in selecting these functionaries.37
Naturally, they first looked to the Shi, but the gates for change had been opened: “This shift from 
consideration of status to that of competence eventually ushered in a new criterion of social 
preference. The term shih [sic] thus acquired a new definition, now referring to a person of 
excellence, one with high capabilities as well as character; it came to refer to a cultural status 
rather than a social grouping.”38 The composition of the Shi became more open—in a sense, 
more meritocratic, if  unwillingly or so gradually as to be unconscious by the class’ original 
constituents. They absorbed into their membership both the wayward or downwardly mobile 
noble seeking a rebound, as well as the upwardly aspirant working man, even the occasional
35 Schwartz, Thought in Ancient China, p. 44: “Another aspect of this feudalism which differentiates it clearly from 
medieval Western feudalism is that the protobureaucratic elements [in the] Shang are also very much present in the
literature o f the Chou [sic]... To be sure, in the Chinese case, the use o f the term 'bureaucracy' should perhaps be 
avoided, and one wonders whether Balazs's term 'officialism' might not be appropriate for this period.”
36 Ibid, p. 44.
37 Hsu, Cho-yun. “The Spring and Autumn Period” in Loewe, Michael and Shaughnessy, Edward L , eds. The
Cambridge History o f  Ancient China: From the Origins o f  Civilization to 221 B. C. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999. p. 583.
38 Ibid, p. 584.
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gifted peasant.39
As the definition of Shi broadened, a wider variety of personalities and skill sets were 
inducted into the ranks. Schools of thought quickly emerged and conflicted. This process went 
on right through the Warring States Period. Graham explains,
During the last centuries of disunion, with the bureaucratization of the competing states, 
the at least partially literate knightly class had become increasingly open to the talents 
and freer to serve whichever ruler offered the best terms. The thinkers of the Axial Age 
are all in or on the edge o f this now fluid class... Although one could get rich by trade, it 
remains the common assumption that the road to wealth and power is through high 
office; consequently, nearly all of them are preoccupied with such questions as when it 
is morally right to accept office in these degenerate times (the Confucians), who 
deserves appointment (the Mohists), whether it is better to avoid employment for the 
benefits of private life (Chuang-tzu). Their whole thinking is a response to the 
breakdown of the moral and political order which had claimed the authority of Heaven; 
and the crucial question for all of them is not the Western philosopher’s ‘What is truth?’ 
but ‘Where is the Way?’, the way to order the state and conduct personal life.40
By virtue of their eventual preponderance in educational positions, the Shi-cum-Rujia was able to 
outlast their competitors the Mohists, Yangists, Taoists, et al.
Thus, it was as scholars that these swordsmen were able to adapt to feudal circumstances 
and secure a future for themselves. In addition, they were both the victims and beneficiaries of 
the feudal lords’ machinations. Bom and raised for a life of service in both military and civil 
capacities, expected to be educated in the Six Arts of ritual, music, archery, charioteering, 
writing, and mathematics, and cultivated in courage, etiquette, and wit, the Shi responded to the 
troubles of their time with an investigation into the inner meaning of their responsibility to serve 
the world. “It was a mentality that nurtured many of the best minds of the time to devote 
themselves to the task of defining and disseminating ideas.”41 It is here when the sword is put 
down and the pen taken up, when the knight becomes the philosopher—and it is here where we 
finally meet Confucius.
REN AND THE SHI
My quote from Graham above is in reference to the so-called Hundred Schools, during 
which time the Shi completed their evolution into the Rujia. My position is that their evolution 
was actually prefigured beforehand, in the Spring and Autumn Period by Confucius and his 
philosophy. I identify two prefigurements of which I will elucidate in this section:
(1) Defining "ren ” as an educational model o f the self: Confucian ren was 
fundamentally a philosophy of education. It thus prefigured the Shi’s turn to education as their 
main vocation during the Warring States Period.
And, (2) the life o f Confucius as prototype for the Rujia: Confucian ren, as described by 
Hall and Ames, reflected the Shi’s state of intense socioeconomic and compositional fluidity. 
More importantly, it was part of the rectificational sweep moving through ancient Chinese 
history. As such, it also provided an ideological framework suitable for the Shi to adapt to, and
39 Ibid., p. 583.
Graham, Disputers, p. 3.
41 Hsu, Cambridge, p. 584.
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participate in, the new civilization emerging around them—and from  them.
Prefigurement (1): Defining “ren " as an educational model o f the self
Hall and Ames define ren as “authoritative personhood" meaning, “one who not only 
extends his sphere of concern to embrace and serve the interests of his community, but who 
literally extends himself to take in his community.”42 A crucial factor in Confucius’ conception 
of ren is “the coextensive and correlative nature of personal, social, and political development.”43 
In the large scheme, this means:
The concern that Confucius has for the relational self and the communication that 
effects it is a major theme throughout the Analects. The identification and articulation 
of interests and importances is the basis for person building and the inclusion of others 
in one’s field of selves. The authoritative person inherits the values and significance of 
his culture and contributes to it in a process of symbolic exchange dominated by the 
medium of language. This language is performative in the sense that, for the 
authoritative person, saying requires the enactment of what is said in order to be true.44
Hall and Ames’ definition of ren can be broken down into its constituent parts:
(A) The “relational s e l f ’: This concept has at its core the idea that the human being is a 
combination of instrumental and aesthetic elements. We exist for each other, supplying 
resources and companionship, and even more importantly, generating meaning in an otherwise 
axiologically neutral universe. In this respect, “relational selfhood” is much like how a 
blacksmith forges a sword from raw ore and fire for use in ceremony or combat. In return; the 
sword—as a product of the man’s efforts and as his source of income—qualifies him as a 
member of the blacksmithing profession. The man is a blacksmith because he makes the sword, 
and the object is a sword because it was made by a blacksmith.
Understanding the concept of relational selfhood requires a ground shift in our post­
industrial, Platonically-informed, and instrumentalist-tending grammar. For Confucius, a human 
being is not a thing, an “it” or “what,” with a necessary static nature; rather, a human being is an 
organism, a “him,” “her,” or “who,” whose nature is, in effect, an open question. So, too, is 
existence an open question:
If we are no longer searching out the Mind of God or the inexorable laws of nature, we 
must search out one another. For, once the myth of objective knowledge has been laid 
to rest, the world ceases to be construed as an objective datum for dispassionate 
investigation and becomes the (relatively) articulated expressions of environing others.
In other words, it becomes culture. And culture is rife with the personal creativity of 
the best representatives of the human community.45
(B) "Person building" or "person making": This concept is to the individual human 
animal what zheng ming is to human society. If a person is in reality a relationally constructed 
entity, then his or her life’s project should be re-creation of themselves and their constituent
42 Hall and Ames, Thinking Through Confucius, p. 182.
43 Ibid., p. 123.
44 Ibid., p. 73.
45 Ibid., p. 120.
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relations. This articulation of the self is performed via his or her setting among other human 
beings. The goal is that both individual and community are “transmitted” into something that is 
breathtaking and heretofore unthought-of, yet also contiguous with previous formulations. There 
is no “thinking outside the box” for Confucius. What he finds more interesting and useful is 
whether the contours of that box can be re-shaped in ameliorative ways. (Indeed, the most 
extreme end of his logic would be to ask whether a box need be a box to be a box.)
Therefore, intersubjectivity is absolutely key to person building. Self-articulation is an 
imperative for each and every person, lest we risk deformation into “retarded individuality” 
[Pinyin: xiao ren; Wade-Giles: hsiao jen]. Indeed, the entire project of Confucius’ 
philosophizing was built around finding the Way toward achieving ren\ The Way he 
“transmitted” was one in which articulation could only be achieved through communal means:
(1) Using the inherited tradition of their community as a conceptual framework for their 
articulation.
(2) Using the community as it exists in that specific historical time and place as an ethical 
framework for their articulation.
And, (3) working toward re-creating the community as it could be, which is the actual act 
of articulation.
Hall and Ames explain, “Jen* [sic] is the integrative process of taking in and subsuming 
the conditions and concerns of the human community in the development and application of 
one’s own personal judgment.”46 The blacksmith decides the way in which ore and flame are to 
be united; he does so operating within certain conceptual guidelines as to the relative nature and 
relative use of a sword; and he does so fully cognizant of those guidelines and of himself as a 
forger of swords. His freedom comes in the form of playful yet serious delight he brings to his 
task, and the originality that erupts thereof.
(C) Consciousness as “blacksmithing" :  I chose the metaphor of the blacksmith both for 
its historical appropriateness (the Spring and Autumn Period was a period of widespread bronze 
use) and its utility in explaining Confucius’ conception of human consciousness. To the Master, 
human consciousness is cultural consciousness, for the development of the mind represents the 
“forging” of meaning in a cosmos that, as the Stoics experienced it, is indifferent to human 
endeavor, yet is metaphysically plastic in our hands. Existential blacksmithing is at the heart of 
the relational self: each and every one of us is “the passage from nature to culture... The human 
being as a maker of meaning has as his initial product, his self, his person.”47
Consciously to bring into being what is not is the purpose of action. This entails the 
freedom of the human being, for without a sense that bringing into being what is not is a 
real possibility, no intentionality is possible... That is to say, human consciousness is 
bom out of a recognition of a state of affairs that are not the case, and human freedom 
underlies the intentional acts that seek to bring into being what is not.48
Therefore, in the most profound way, to be fully human is to be action, or, as Hall and Ames put 
it, to live in recognition of your essential performativeness.
(D) Language as performative action: The spoken or written word is itself an act which 
generates meaning—blacksmithing that uses ink and paper or breath and thought instead of raw
Ibid., p. 74.
47 Ibid., p. 74.
48 Ibid., p. 74.
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ore and fire. Language in this sense necessarily entails “the enactment of what is said in order to 
be true,” or in other words “realizing” [zhi] via “living up to one’s word” [xin]. Additionally, it 
is directly connected to cultural consciousness, for language becomes both product and producer 
of li (ritual action) and yi (personal signification).
Li in Confucian terminology has several connotations, the most important of which is its 
“disclosing and displaying function.”49 Be they the rules of religious rites or the rules of 
interpersonal etiquette, rituals are not divinely commanded nor are they socially normative; 
rather, they are the channels through which a man or woman may embody their community as 
well as act positively and constructively in their historical setting. Yi in Confucian terminology 
is shorthand for the goal of achieving “a self-realizing person-in-context”50:
It is objectified in that, no longer asserting merely one limited perspective in its 
interpretation of experience, it does not make any final distinction between self and 
other in construing the world. To express this another way, the person-in-context 
understands “self’ as a dynamic and changing focus of existence characteristically 
expanding and contracting over some aspect of the process of becoming, the 
interpretation of which is grounded in and involves reference to the environing whole.51
Li andyi are, then, the fundamental building blocks to “authoritative personhood,” for the ren 
person, in exercising his or her sense of appropriateness and carefully selecting the way in which 
they invest their innate dynamism into social relations, “authors” a renewed, rejuvenated, 
recreated culture for himself, his contemporaries, and future generations.52 In total, to be ren is 
to live, in mind and deed, zheng ming.
We can now see how Confucius’ philosophy was reflective of his class conditions. To 
re-state, the Shi were entering into a state of intense socioeconomic and compositional fluidity, 
which necessitated a major re-conception of themselves as a class. The Master’s approach to the 
question of the human person was, fundamentally, one of cultivation and edification, rather than 
inculcation and obedience. The goal of his approach was self-articulation rather than 
subservience. In other words, education rather than indoctrination, and his model for the self 
was one in which the human person was malleable, capable of being shaped and shaping itself so 
long as it had right knowledge.
Such a philosophy of personhood called for radical flexibility, not only with regards to 
external (historical) conditions of constant flux and upheaval, but also radical flexibility for 
interior (psychological) conditions within oneself. For Confucius, to measure one’s value as a 
human being on socioeconomic conditions would be to beg disaster. Agreeable a statement 
though this may be to a Westerner, the Master did not mean what we expect: whereas we, 
schooled in Platonic dichotomies, would define the conflation of socioeconomic standing with 
personal worth as “debasement” through “materialism,” Confucius defined it as undermining 
oneself through excessive focus upon the individual self rather than the relational self. “The 
process of becoming an exemplary person in Confucian thought entails both the dissolution o f a 
delimiting and retarding distinction between self and other, and the active integration of this
49 Ibid, p. 86.
50 Ibid, p. 94.
51 Ibid, p. 93.
i2 Ibid, pp. 84,180-182.
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liberated self into the social field through the disclosure ofyi.”53 Too stringent an imagining of 
one’s interior world through any means—and certainly through socioeconomic means, which by 
their very nature fix people into niches would have the same effect upon a person’s self­
conception—would result in the inability to adapt to new circumstances, to rejoice in the 
adaptation, and to flourish, however humbly in material terms, as a result of the adaptation.
Thus, Confucian philosophy simultaneously provided the ideological framework for the Shi’s 
new vocation as educators, as well as the values the individual Shi needed to cope with feudal 
circumstances.
Prefigurement (2): The life o f Confucius as prototype for the Rujia
Turning to the question of Confucius’ life, when the Five Classics are used in conjunction 
with the Analects and the other Four Books, in total the Confucian canon provides the few 
relatively sturdy biographical facts that can be said about Confucius:
(1) He was a member of the Shi class in the fiefdom of Lu, a stronghold of Zhou high 
culture. His family the Kungs were likely to have been descended from the military wing of the 
class rather than the civilian, and that like many of the Shi during the Eastern Zhou era, they 
suffered from declining fortunes.
(2) His youth and young adulthood were spent in “genteel poverty” and he was forced by 
circumstances to hold menial jobs in the areas of accounting, grain distribution, and/or penal law.
(3) His middle age was spent in itinerancy, wandering from administrative job to 
administrative job, from fiefdom to fiefdom. He experienced severe privation, to the point of 
near starvation, and was also attacked by brigands and peasants. He ultimately returned to his 
homeland, impoverished and undistinguished.
(4) Sporadically throughout his life he also worked as an educator. He settled upon this 
as his final profession during his elderly years.
These facts are roughly consistent with his own autobiographical statement: “At fifteen 
my heart-and-mind were set upon learning; at thirty I took my stance; at forty I was no longer of 
two minds; at fifty I realized the ming o f tian [the will of heaven]; at sixty my ear was attuned; 
and at seventy I could give my heart-and-mind free rein without overstepping the mark.” (An. 
2:4) 1 add the following comments:
(1-a) During the Spring and Autumn Period, “although one could get rich by trade, it 
remains the common assumption that the road to wealth and power is through high office; 
consequently, nearly all o f [ancient China’s intelligentsia, the Shi-cum-Ruja] are preoccupied 
with such questions as when it is morally right to accept office in these degenerate times (the 
Confucians)... [etc.]”54 (I will return to this in a moment.)
(2-a) The texts vary radically about the jobs he worked throughout his life. For the most 
part they agree that he never made it higher than superintendency or similarly low management 
(for example, An. 2:4 and 4:6). This is opposed to the traditional historiography, which would 
have us wrongly believe that he had attained incredibly high position within Lu, all the way to 
the prime ministry.
(3-a) It was his travels that familiarized him with the political and cultural conditions of 
the other Spring and Autumn fiefdoms. Additionally, the variety of his experiences probably 
contributed to his popularity among the young men who became his students.
(4-a) It was in his capacity as educator that he actually achieved his greatest success, *51
53 Ibid, p. 93.
51 Graham, Disputers, p. 3.
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though not materially. He was never pleased with this fact, and perished disappointed in himself. 
Legge reports Confucius saying to his students,
“[...] last night I dreamt that I was sitting with offerings before me between the two 
pillars. No intelligent monarch arises; there is not one in the kingdom that will make 
me his master. My time has come to die.” So it was. He went to his couch, and after 
seven days, expired. Such is the account which we have of the last hours of the great 
philosopher of China. His end was not unimpressive, but it was melancholy.55
It is an incredible irony that he went to his death believing himself a failure, only to in time 
become China’s “uncrowned emperor.”
Returning to Comment (1-a), the question of whether “it is morally right to accept office 
[in] degenerate times” was a question unlikely to have occurred to an aristocrat, and almost 
certainly would not have been of interest to a bom and bred peasant. However, logically it 
would have been a question of extreme interest to a Shi. That he attracted so many students—all 
told seventy-seven, not including the eighty or so others in orbit—tells us something, too. Who 
were they? Textual evidence indicates that they were, for the most part, of Shi background 
(Graham suggests that working men would have been more attracted to the philosophy of 
Mozi).56 They must have been drawn to him because the historical Confucius—not the 
Confucius transmitted/re-created by later generations into the universal religion of 
“Confucianism”—was probably very concerned with the ethical and spiritual well-being of his 
fellow Shi. As it happened, he would have been in a unique socioeconomic position to do so: his 
family history “reflected the downward social mobility of many noble houses of the Spring and 
Autumn Period. He retained a memory of the past glory, but had the experience of a life of 
service.”57
We can now see how Confucius’ life served as a prototype for the Rujia. His fluctuating 
socioeconomic position was the reason and resource for his philosophizing and teaching. And 
what of the vocation he finally settled upon? “Hardly any information survives about a teaching 
profession before Confucius, but we have noticed how natural it is to see his thought as springing 
from the preoccupations of such a profession,”58 (my italics). That the Master had to turn to 
teaching to earn a living is the crowning irony of his life, for so, too, would a great many of his 
fellow Shi have to make the same decision not long after his death. Indeed, more than he may 
have realized, Confucius showed them the Way to their salvation.
CONCLUSION
Confucius experienced and embodied the existential and dynamic tensions in what it 
meant to be a Shi during the Eastern Zhou era. From his family background, he inherited an 
intimate knowledge of the sage-kingdoms’ world and culture. Meanwhile, his actual life of 
scraping together enough meager funds to survive, all the while wandering state to state for 
frustratingly fruitless employment, inspired him to imagine a society in which individuals were 
capable of transcending class limitations.59 Thus, in Confucius, biography, philosophy, and the
55 Legge, Confucius, p. 87.
56 Graham, Disputers, pp. 34,-36,45.
57 Hsu, Cambridge, p. 585.
58 Graham, Disputers, p. 32.
59 Hsu, Cambridge, pp. 585-586.
The Histories. Volume 7. Number 2 35
broader brush strokes of history came together in a trilectical process that prefigured the rise o f 
the Rujia.
We can now see how his philosophy emerged from the rectificational process at work in 
ancient Chinese history. Ironically, the “Confucian trilectic” was analogous to the trilectical 
development of Chinese civilization, that is, the interaction of the Zhou world with the 
“barbarians” and “semi-barbarians” on its ever-expanding periphery. So, too, was the 
philosophy the Master developed ever-expanding. It was the eventual transformation of the Shi 
into the Rujia that initiated the change of “Confucianism” from a philosophy designed to address 
the needs and concerns of a particular class, into a universal creed. Just as China grew outward 
to encompass, centralize, and consolidate its constituent fiefdoms and much of the continent o f 
Asia, “Confucianism” grew outward to encompass, incorporate, and appropriate the sea of 
individual minds that constituted the ancient Chinese people, devouring, absorbing, and re­
contextualizing its competitors in Mohism, Legalism, Yin-Yangism, and even Taoism as it went.
What was this teacher’s most salient lesson for you and I today? We may have in 
Confucius and “Confucianism” one of those rare instances in which the Adam Smithian notion 
of enlightened self-interest came true. His program was essentially this: that a life of 
compassionate service to virtue and state meant service to the very real flesh and blood human 
beings of one’s social circle, and by extension, all of society. A life lived in this manner meant 
the realization of the individual’s relationality in mind and deed. Thus, Confucius discovered the 
secret of the Shi’s moral and professional elevation as lying in the harmonization of “self’ and 
“other.” These ideas represented something very revolutionary in the context of ancient China. 
Consider his peer and bete noir, Laozi, who, like the monks of Christianity, sought salvation in 
nature, away from people. Confucius refused to believe that salvation was to be found in 
isolation. His most basic article of faith—and his greatest lesson—was that salvation was to be ’ 
found in civilization, among people.
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